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Introduction 
In an extensive policy review from 1990, new-institutional theorist Brian Rowan 
noted that states and school districts all over the United States in the 1980s seemed to 
bow to what he labeled as an external control strategy of educational reform, which 
had been initiated and implemented with the purpose of raising the level of 
educational outcomes in public schooling. Specifically, this reform strategy was 
characterized by curriculum control, behavioral control, standardization, and 
accountability devices through testing regimes and monitoring of results (Rowan & 
Miller, 2007). A contrasting and widely enacted reform model that was also observed 
was labeled a professional commitment strategy (Rosenholtz, 1987; Rowan, 1990). A 
collaborative trust culture was a key component of this model, emphasizing teacher 
autonomy, professional collaboration, and distributive leadership styles employed at 
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both school level and district level (Nir, 2014; Rosenholtz, 1989). In a theoretical 
sense, these two seemingly conflicting school reform strategies mirror conceptions of 
schools and municipalities as tightly coupled versus loosely coupled governance 
systems (Weick, 1982). The view of educational systems as tightly coupled implies a 
management model, in which school administrators at higher levels of the system 
employ control devices towards municipalities and schools, and the higher-ranked 
administrators can feel confident that school leaders and principals will implement 
decisions in practice (Weick, 1982). In contrast, the conception of school 
organizations as loosely coupled acknowledges that school governance takes place in 
multi-level systems, encompassing state agencies, municipalities and schools, which 
entails many broken chains (Paulsen, Johansson, Nihlfors, Moos, & Risku, 2014).  
 
However, as noted by Rowan (1990), the models of external control and professional 
commitment were seldom implemented in a pure form in school districts and 
schools. This is not surprising “since they are abstract models” (Rowan, 1990, p. 
381) and can therefore be conceived as “twin-strategies”. This crucial point 
corresponds with Weick’s widely overlooked theoretical proposition that loose 
coupling must be treated as a dialectical concept (Weick, 1976) since organizational 
systems tend to be both loosely and tightly coupled simultaneously, which means 
that some elements within the same system can be tightly coupled, whereas others 
are loosely coupled or even decoupled from each other (Weick, 1982). This is 
particularly the case in multi-level governance systems of public education, manifest 
in relations between state bodies, municipalities and schools that are coupled tightly 
in some areas and more loosely in others (Paulsen & Moos, 2014; Paulsen, Strand, et 
al., 2014). Specifically, when national control devices meet the local level in 
municipalities, several actors are involved in the further implementation towards 
schools and their leaders, and a transformation process will probably occur. Further, 
the local levels can be conceived as a political arena in which national control 
devices meet a more trust-based culture of school governing (Nir, 2014). In that 
respect, quality assurance concepts and control devices will go through “cultural 
compatibility tests” when they meet local cultures (Christensen & Lægreid, 2002), 
and both school boards and superintendents can both act as mediators in these 
processes. Therefore, it is difficult to accurately predict how national control is 
implemented when quality assurance devices they meet local government systems 
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and are enacted further towards school leaders and teachers. Moreover, it can be 
expected that school boards and superintendents act as translators and semi-
autonomous agent in the process through which national control devices are enacted 
in the interplay with schools (Paulsen, 2015). 
 
The current paper follows this line of reasoning and analyzes the ways in which 
school boards and school superintendents enact state strategies of external control 
when they encounter local school governance systems in Norwegian municipalities. 
The analysis is a review of published work in the form of journal articles, book 
chapters, and peer-reviewed conference papers, based on a synthesis of the 
Norwegian findings drawn from a large-scale Nordic research project undertaken 
from 2009 to 2014. During the research process, data from Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark were collected from school board members, superintendents, 
and school principals through joint survey instruments. Specifically, the analysis 
seeks to shed light on how external control devices are enacted by school boards and 
superintendents in Norway when they meet local professional cultures.  
 
Theoretical framework 
The concept of control in organizations 
In conceptual terms, control has been defined as “the ability to exert some influence 
over one’s environment so that the environment becomes more rewarding or less 
threatening” (Ganster, 1989, p. 3). The primary control activity is to search for and 
warn of mistakes and irregularities, which frequently stimulates hierarchical control 
activities towards subordinates. This form of control refers to post hoc investigations, 
which fail to directly affect current processes to prevent mistakes or losses from 
occurring in the future. Moreover, hierarchical control may occur internally; that is, 
where managers carry out the control activities themselves initiated by mismatches in 
performance compared with targets. Alternatively, the control may be external, 
where control authorities outside the formal decision-making system check whether 
procedures are being followed correctly in order to ensure that the surroundings do 
not suffer (Høyer et al., 2014). Specifically, external control also involves 
supervisory activities that are continuously undertaken to follow up on occurring 
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events in order to ensure that various management actors achieve the organization’s 
goals.  
 
Beck-Jørgensen (1987) identified five different forms of external control: 
bureaucracy, democracy, markets, knowledge, and collective norms and values. He 
believed that these forms of control capture the spectrum of control mechanisms 
through which external hierarchical control contrasts self-regulation as a form of 
empowered internal control (Beck-Jørgensen, 1987). State bodies, regional 
governors, municipal school administration, and local politicians operate their 
functions within the Norwegian national quality assurance system towards school 
leaders within a given municipality (Nihlfors et al., 2014; Paulsen, Strand, et al., 
2014). Following, a cornerstone of the quality assurance regime presumes school 
leaders, i.e. principals and heads of subject-departments, to assess, monitor and 
supervise teachers in their classroom work based on academic performance targets. 
External control implemented in multi-level organizational systems evidently reflects 
an instrumental approach to organizations as tools that actors with clear goal-means 
perceptions have designed in order to achieve certain goals in predetermined ways 
(March & Olsen, 1989).  
In educational systems, the purpose of external control is to “produce faithful 
implementation of a program’s preferred teaching regime, through tight restrictions 
on teacher autonomy and a corresponding focus on a narrow band of teaching 
practices” (Rowan & Miller, 2007, p. 254). According to this perspective, the 
relationship between the leader and the co-workers, and between upper and lower 
levels in a governance system, is the co-existence of common interests and 
compatible goals. Accordingly, control and incentive mechanisms are necessary in 
order to make it unpalatable to not follow the behavioral norms issued through the 
formal organization structure. Therefore, trust that emerges from efficient control 
systems and incentive systems is considered a kind of “mistrust-based trust” (Høyer 
& Wood, 2011). 
 
The concept of trust in organizations 
In interpersonal and intra-organizational settings, trust is defined as “a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
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Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Trust is often measured by three characteristics of the 
trustee; ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
Gambetta (1988) argued that trust is irrelevant without some form of risk and 
freedom to behave in a manner that is unpredictable or contrary to the wishes of the 
actors. Therefore, trust and mistrust are theoretically strongly related to the 
phenomena of risk and uncertainty (Gambetta, 1988). Viewing risk as a dangerous 
property makes it easier to respond with distrust. On the other hand, a trusting actor 
may have stronger expectations of a positive outcome of cooperation and may 
therefore have more solid basic trust, which can reduce the focus on risk and the 
perception of the scope of the risk (Høyer & Wood, 2011). As noted: “Trust is 
necessary for effective cooperation and communication, the foundations for cohesive 
and productive relationships in organizations” (Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000, p. 
549). Notably, there is also a relationship between interpersonal trust and teachers’ 
sense of empowerment in decision making: “When teachers not only have 
involvement but also influence over organizational decisions that affect them, the 
conditions necessary to foster mutual trust between teachers and principals becomes 
manifest” (Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015, p. 69).  
Arguably, vertical organizational trust represents an alternative to external control 
mechanisms, both internal and external to the organization and co-temporal or 
retrospective to the event (Mayer et al., 1995). As such, trust between actors 
functions as a “lubricant” for productive collaboration in groups (Kahn, 1990) when 
people have confidence in other people’s words and deeds. Therefore, trust is a much 
faster and more economical than other means in terms of managing and leading 
organizational life (Powell, 1990). At the same time, actors in a trusting cooperation 
tend to be influenced by some kind of self-obligation, which includes not engaging in 
activities that may betray the mutual trust relationships that characterize cooperation. 
Beck-Jørgensen (1987) referred to such obligation approaches as self-regulation. A 
trusting interaction among people, groups, or organizational units that are 
interconnected in the same governance system also includes an element of risk, 
which measures or prescribed routines in an uncertain situation from a lack of control 
(Høyer & Wood, 2011).   Finally, writers have pointed to the inherent delicate 
balance between control and trust in modern organizations (Sørhaug, 1996), where 
trust also is built by means of openness when control is exerted: “Principals also 
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garner the trust of their faculty by being open in both information and 
control”(Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015, p. 69).  
 
External control manifest in school reform strategies 
A range of scholars since Rowan (1990) have argued that the external control model 
has diffused towards a global standard or “reform movement” (Meyer & Benavot, 
2013; Shirley, 2011). As posited by Pasi Sahlberg, “schools are more frequently 
controlled by data collected from various aspects of the teaching and learning 
process. Continuous reporting, evaluations, and inspections are diminishing the 
actual autonomy of teachers and the degrees of freedom of schools” (Sahlberg, 2011, 
p. 180). Over the past 20 years, educational tasks and responsibilities in Nordic 
countries have been decentralized from the state level to the municipal and school 
level. Consequently, “the national political level has perceived a need for the 
legislators and ministry to strengthen the control of the levels below in new ways, not 
merely via regulations” (Johansson et al., 2013, p. 174). In Sweden, for example, a 
new inspection agency has been established in the governance structures. In Norway, 
municipalities are required to establish quality assurance systems that are comprised 
of evaluating, documenting, and following up on the results of the schools, using the 
main control devices of state supervision and school inspection (Nihlfors et al., 
2014). Then external control in practice refers to when an actor, by virtue of 
contractual obligations, “has the right to hold another actor responsible to a set of 
standards, to judge whether the standards have been met, and to intervene or impose 
sanctions if the standards are deemed unfulfilled” (Paulsen & Skedsmo, 2014, p. 43).  
 
In the external control model, policy makers and administrators from the top of the 
hierarchy impose two main tools – curriculum alignment and behavioral control – on 
schools, principals, and teachers. Curriculum alignment encompasses several 
comprehensive control instruments, such as “systems of input, behavior, and output 
control designed to regulate classroom teaching and standardize student opportunities 
for learning” (Rowan, 1990, p. 354). Moreover, criterion-referenced tests were 
applied to control output in terms of student achievements. These input- and output 
control mechanisms were reinforced using the second main component; namely, 
behavioral control of teachers and school leaders. This was done through streamlined 
in-service workshops for teachers, uniform approaches to teaching, and uniform 
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supervisory practices paired with standardization of policy goals. Behavioral control 
was also launched in the form of a standardized training program for teachers, 
administrators, and school leaders, and clear preferences regarding the type of 
projects and developmental activities that would gain the support of the governance 
system (Rowan, 1990).  
 
Trust-based commitment as educational reform strategy 
A trust-based commitment approach to instructional change works differently. First, 
it emphasizes teachers’ discretion and empowerment in the adaptation of 
instructional changes to the genuine context of their classes and students. Second, the 
commitment model aims to strengthen the collective responsibility among teachers 
for instructional improvements by developing professional learning communities 
within schools. Third, a commitment strategy model expands teachers’ engagement 
in professional network structures in order to strengthen their capacity to absorb 
external knowledge and utilize it for instructional improvement purposes. This 
conception of educational reform takes cultural control as its basic mechanism, as 
“we would expect ‘cultural’ control to replace formal controls and teachers to base 
their commitment to personal identification with the school rather than loyalty to 
superiors” (Rowan, 1990, p. 359). In this perspective, trust is rooted in loyalty and 
binds to norms, values, and belief systems that have gained hegemony, and this form 
of trust is not conditional on finding good control and incentive systems that make it 
profitable to follow the behavioral norms given through formal normative structures 
(Scott, 2001). Instead, trust is anchored in the basic notion that individual actions are 
characterized by the “logic of appropriateness” – the type of actions that are regarded 
as appropriate within the role set of a profession’s normative sphere (March & Olsen, 
1989). Such a culture of reform and governing, embodied by school boards and 
superintendents, is typically characterized by “a tendency to express high trust in 
schools evident in the limited efforts to control and closely monitor schools’ conduct. 
This pattern grants school level educators considerable degrees of freedom, allowing 
them to act in accordance with their professional judgment within a predetermined 
framework set by state policies and regulations” (Nir, 2014, p. 9). 
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Trust-based group collaborations 
A trust-based school governing culture is also manifest in the relationship between 
the municipal school superintendent and the group of school principals to which that 
the superintendent is associated with. Specifically, it is arguably important that when 
school principals are assembled by superintendents in municipal school leadership 
groups, a climate of psychological safety is beneficial in terms of establishing shared 
understandings of how to deal with school reform implementation. Therefore, the 
extent to which school principals perceive the climate as safe and trusting will 
constitute an important coupling mechanism in the governance line. A safe group 
climate is then characterized by school leadership group members “feeling able to 
show and employ one’s self without fear of negative consequences to self-image, 
status, or career” (Kahn, 1990, p. 708). Psychological safety builds on and goes 
beyond trust, denoting a group climate characterized by a shared belief among the 
members that the team is a safe zone for speaking up, identifying problems, and 
bringing in new perspectives (Edmondson, 1999). When psychological safety is high, 
group members will be confident that no one will be embarrassed, rejected, or 
punished by someone else in the team for offering critical viewpoints, novelties, 
negative performance information, or contrasting perspectives. Groups whose 
members are not penalized for making a mistake, and are instead encouraged to ask 
for help, tend to utilize the team’s knowledge reservoir to improve work processes 
and find ways towards identify improvements (Edmondson, 1999; Nembhard & 
Edmondson, 2006). We consider this to be particularly important in a school 
governing system, where one of the main avenues of influence at superintendents’ 
hand goes through group interaction with school principals. 
 
Methodology 
The current paper presents a review of published findings from a Nordic research 
project undertaken from 2009 to 2014 aiming to illuminate the processes through 
which national reform policies are filtered when they meet the ‘meso-level’ of the 
municipalities. The sample of published work, on which the current paper is based, is 
presented in table 1 below. The research project investigated school governing 
processes in Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Finnish municipalities by means of 
joint survey instruments developed in a theory-based evaluative design. Specifically, 
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the Nordic research team conducted a school superintendent survey in 2009, a school 
board survey in 2011, and a school principal survey in 2013 – all of them focused on 
the interplay between school politicians, superintendents and school leaders.  
 
 
 
All questionnaires were transmitted electronically through self-managing web-survey 
systems, and dropout analyses were undertaken by all four research-teams, 
comparing the samples with the total population. The results indicate that the 
national samples of superintendents and school principals were fairly representative 
to their respective populations, whereas the school board survey in 2011 came out 
with a lower response rate and thereby a risk of some biases. 
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Control devices in the Norwegian quality assurance system 
Global standardization of school governing 
There is little doubt that Norwegian educational policies have been more strongly 
adapted to OECD standards during the last two decades, not least as a response on 
Norway’s long-term mediocre position in the PISA studies. Essentially, the OECD 
influence takes the form of country reviews (for example, based on PISA results) and 
policy recommendations advising member nations’ governments to take specific 
national actions, primarily based on the results of their international standardized 
tests (Paulsen & Moos, 2014). In Norway, the adaptation of national policies to the 
OECD frame of reference has been most noticeable in the introduction of the 
National System of Quality Assurance (NSQA) in 2005 (Eurydice, 2006).2 By 
function, the evaluation tools in the NSQA provide information about student 
achievement levels on an aggregated level, which can be used as a foundation for 
national policymaking and setting priorities for improvement strategies. As such, it 
represents a strong indirect means of centrally regulating and coordinating the school 
system (Johansson et al., 2013; Skedsmo, 2009, 2011). Central tools of the system 
are a yearly quality report conducted by the municipalities, seen as school owners; 
state supervision towards municipalities and schools; and the majority of national 
achievement tests and standardized surveys (for example, student survey and teacher 
survey) being managed by the National Directorate of Training and Learning.3 
 
Curriculum alignment as a control device 
In Rowan’s (1990) terminology, the main instruments in the NSQA can also be seen 
as the employment of an external control strategy. Several instruments in use in the 
NSQA are implemented with the purpose of aligning local curricula, syllabuses, and 
teaching practices with national frames by means of standardizing systems of output 
control, which is designed to regulate classroom teaching and homogenize norms of 
                                                
2 The Norwegian System of Quality Assurance   (NSQA) is designed to contribute to quality 
development at all levels of compulsory education, with a particular focus on basic skills in language, 
reading, writing, arithmetic, and ICT (Eurydice 2006). 
3 The National Directorate of Education and Training is the executive agency for the Ministry of 
Education and Research. It has the overall responsibility for supervision, education, and governance 
of the education sector, as well as for the implementation of Acts of Parliament and regulations. The 
Directorate is responsible for all national statistics concerning kindergarten, primary, and secondary 
education. On the basis of these statistics, it initiates, develops, and monitors research and 
development. See: http://www.udir.no/Stottemeny/English/Norwegian-Directorate-for-Education-and-
Training/  
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successful schooling.   Moreover, national student achievement test programs, have 
been implemented on a yearly basis from 2005. Alongside national student survey 
and teacher survey, local school priorities are significantly aligned with national 
frames, which are also fairly well adapted to the OECD discourse of education.  
 
 
 
Behavioral control 
As Rowan (1990) also noted, the alignment of curriculum instruments tend to be 
reinforced by district-level administrators using the second main component, which 
is behavioral control of teachers and school leaders. This component involved 
standardized training programs for teachers, administrators, and school leaders paired 
with streamline in-service workshops for teachers. Since the establishment of the 
Norwegian Directorate of Education and Training as a semi-independent state 
agency, there has been a series of national training programs for school leaders and 
teachers. Specifically, a national training program for school principals was launched 
in 2009, followed by a similar program for leaders of day-care institutions. 
Moreover, the Directorate has also conducted a national training program for 
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leadership recruits in education; that is, teachers who wish to enter leadership 
positions in schools.  
 
Standardized national training programs can be seen as behavioral control 
instruments that state agencies use to steer and align conceptions of leadership in the 
practical field of the school institution by explicating a clear frame of reference of 
what is an “appropriate” understanding of contemporary school leadership. 
Behavioral control is also launched in the form of national school developmental 
projects initiated by the Directorate, which implies clear preferences for the type of 
projects and developmental activities that would gain the necessary funding and 
support of supervision. Table 3 provides an overview of the most important 
behavioral control devices in use. 
 
 
 
A predominant source of behavioral control of municipalities and schools is the state 
supervision system based on the yearly quality report. The Directorate of Education 
and Training is responsible for organizing the state supervision of targeted areas, 
developing methods and procedures for the supervision, and supervising private 
schools (The Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, 2010).  The 19 
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county governors have to coordinate the state supervision within each of the 
counties. The supervision procedures are developed by the Norwegian Directorate 
for Education and Training and assembled in a specific manual for supervision of 
municipalities and schools. 
 
In cases where practice diverges from regulations, the supervision authority will 
instruct a change of practice (Skedsmo, 2009), which  implies that the municipality 
literally has to initiate a practice that already was expected to be implemented - and 
thus not imply any new obligations (The Norwegian Directorate for Education and 
Training, 2010). 
 
 
Control and mistrust in local political school governing 
Mixed perceptions of state supervision among school board members 
As noted earlier, municipalities and not schools are the primary targets for state 
supervision in the Norwegian system. Consequently, inspection and control are only 
loosely coupled with the everyday life of principals and teachers, which creates the 
potential for critical issues to be filtered out when the system of state supervision 
meets the school level. Moreover, not all municipalities are selected for state 
supervision every year and when a municipality is selected for supervision (by the 
state governor) only a small number of its schools are subjected to inspection.  
 
The Norwegian school board members participating in the research project were 
asked about possible tensions between the state and local politicians regarding state 
supervision. We first asked the members whether they have been targeted for state 
supervision during their four-year period, two contrasting sets of perceptions emerge: 
“The first perceives of state supervision as being externally controlled, as well as 
being another bureaucratic maneuver from the state’s side, both of which are overtly 
negative. The upfront cases cluster round an image of state supervision as an 
activation trigger for making improvement initiatives from the school owner’s side. 
In a similar vein, these members perceive performance monitoring in a more positive 
manner as a feedback mechanism that can be productively utilized” (Paulsen & 
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Strand, 2014, p. 58). Specifically, the Norwegian school board members viewed state 
supervision as a “methodology for detecting discrepancies and errors for subsequent 
improvement processes with the purpose of raising the general standard of schooling 
within the municipality” (Høyer et al., 2014, p. 108). 
 
Control devices towards superintendents and principals 
The school board members were also asked to respond, in their own words, regarding 
tasks and issues for which they will hold the superintendent accountable and 
responsible as related to educational targets. A visible focus on external control is 
manifested through demands for responsibility for quality control procedures when 
board members expressed their expectations of their municipal school 
superintendents: Monitoring and evaluating school results and quality indicators. In a 
similar vein, the Norwegian case also showed external control demands imposed on 
school superintendents in the form of accountability for student results (academic 
achievements and rankings on national tests). Specifically, the free-form responses 
indicate that board members tend to hold the superintendent accountable for the 
schools (within their municipality) delivering a satisfactory level of student 
achievements.  
 
Similarly, the responses indicate the demand for accountability for pupils’ and 
students’ (of their municipality) rankings on national tests. Moreover, school board 
members tend to hold the superintendent responsible for quality assurance routines, 
such as monitoring and evaluating school results and quality indicators and reporting 
that deviates from professional practices (Paulsen & Strand, 2014). With regard to 
demands imposed on school principals, the survey instrument also asked the school 
board members what kind of educational targets and tasks they expect the 
superintendent to hold their principals responsible and accountable for. The rhetoric 
in these responses was notably softer. School board members expect school 
principals to be responsible for good learning conditions for students and good work 
conditions for teachers. Similarly, they expect principals to ensure good 
psychological support structure for their teachers (Høyer et al., 2014). 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
Mistrust in the local governance chain 
Using the example of Sweden, school board members there indicated a low level of 
trust in the capacity of school principals to lead school development, and also 
assessed the school principals’ competence as mediocre (Nihlfors & Johansson, 
2013, p. 6). On the other hand, the school principals showed strong loyalty to the 
state in governing Swedish schools and felt it was fair for the state to increasingly 
bypass the municipalities in school governing (Johansson, Nihlfors, & Steen, 2014). 
The Norwegian school board members were asked to assess their superintendents’ 
competence in important leadership areas, such as ensuring good working conditions 
for schooling, allocating resources to the schools, mobilizing for school improvement 
and school development in general; the results indicated only a modest level of 
assessments (variation in positive assessments between 50 and 60 percent). 
Furthermore, when the board members assessed the level of competence among 
school principals (within their municipality), a further decline is observable, since 
“only 32% of the members in the sample saw their school principals as fairly good in 
leading school development. Moreover, when the board members were asked to 
express their perceptions about school principals’ loyalty (with conflicting interests 
about student learning), only 41.5% of the board members trusted that their school 
principals would side with the interests of the students” (Paulsen & Strand, 2014, p. 
41). We believe that this pattern indicates a low level of trust between local school 
politicians and principals. 
 
 
Municipal school owners’ competence assessed by principals 
The school principal survey assesses the municipalities’ competence in critical 
domains of their functions as school owners. We used a well-rounded survey 
instrument that captures the principals’ assessment of school owner competence in 
educational policy, leadership development, law issues, and local curriculum 
development (Paulsen, 2014b). Only 56 percent of the 949 school principals in the 
sample assessed the competence of their municipality as satisfactory in terms of 
“educational policies”. This score must be regarded as mediocre considering the 
central role that municipalities are given in the Norwegian school governing chain. 
Furthermore, only 40 percent of the principals felt that “the municipality’s work with 
the annual quality report supports my school development endeavors” and only 39 
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percent perceived that their municipality (school owner) “evaluates actively how 
reforms work at the school level.” It is noteworthy that, “among the principals in the 
sample, the municipalities are assessed as below mediocre when it comes to 
competence in leadership development, local curriculum development and 
evaluation. The assessment indicates, firstly, a modest level of capacity in 
pedagogical and leadership skills throughout the municipality sector, and, secondly, 
and large internal variation across the municipalities that are represented in the 
study” (Paulsen, 2014b, p. 13).  
 
Trust in the administrative governing line 
School principals’ assessment of vertical trust to superintendents 
We also asked the school principals to assess the level of organizational trust in 
relation to their superintendent, by means of multiple pre-validated indicators 
adapted to the actual research setting. The findings show that school principals have 
a high level of vertical trust in superintendents along a range of domains (Paulsen, 
Nihlfors, Brinkkjær, & Risku, 2015). For example, 92 percent of principals indicated 
that they have no problem informing their superintendent if they have made a 
mistake in their job as principals. Seen against the backdrop of the mistrust problem 
in the relation between school politicians and principals, this homogenous response 
pattern assessed by principals shows a contrasting image.  
 
The inference is supported when shifting to the school leader groups, led by the 
superintendent. The data portrays a high level of psychological safety in the groups 
(Paulsen, 2014b). As noted, psychological safety builds on a relation of trust between 
the members of the group. From this starting point, the members develop an 
emerging state of a trusting group climate, which is a crucial factor for learning in 
groups. According to Paulsen (2014b), “a sustainable learning climate characterized 
by psychological safety and openness for ideas is crucial for mutual adaptation 
between the school owner and the group of school principals that work in the 
crossfire of conflicting demands and expectations related to school improvement and 
reform implementation” (Paulsen, 2014b, p. 18). This finding concurs with a number 
of studies, which have shown that a supportive and coaching leadership style 
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promotes psychological safety in groups, in conjunction with trusting and authentic 
behavior (Edmondson, 1999).  
 
Superintendents as mediators of external control 
Our investigation indicates that superintendents are mediating agents in a broken 
chain of school governance: “Our findings underscore the hypothesis of a ‘political 
vacuum’ in Norwegian municipalities when it comes to local school governance 
evident in local curriculum development, evaluation criteria, implementation 
strategies, organizational innovation and learning goals. When this occurs in a 
situation characterized by a vague and unclear policy regime, it stimulates 
superintendents to fill the gaps by means of their own preferences” (Paulsen & 
Skedsmo, 2014, p. 48). In consequence, through performing mediation roles as 
coordinators and gatekeepers, “a series of national policy initiatives have been 
filtered out in the superintendents’ daily dialogues with the school principals. 
Moreover, the national quality assurance rhetoric has been translated into softer 
language when the superintendents meet their school principals through discussions 
focused on quality issues” (Paulsen & Skedsmo, 2014, p. 48).  
 
Specifically, the superintendents in the sample were asked to rank their three most 
important tasks in relationship to working with their school principals. Two hundred 
and forty-seven out of the 291 superintendents in the study (85 percent) responded to 
this open question; their response rates appear within seven categories, which we 
identified as: (a) quality management, (b) human resource management, (c) financial 
management, (d) administration and coordination, (e) pedagogical leadership and 
school improvement, (f) student learning oriented tasks, and (g) strategic leadership.  
 
The quality management theme is only modestly represented in the superintendents’ 
descriptive data regarding their ranked agendas with their school principals, counting 
for 89 out of 747 responses (11 percent). Also within this theme is a tendency in the 
superintendents’ rhetoric to avoid the control aspect in favor of softer terms such as 
quality development and quality- system development. Second, administrative 
themes in total account for 433 out of 747 responses (60 percent), which indicates a 
relatively strong administrative work profile among the superintendents in the 
sample. Third, pedagogical leadership and school development tasks accounted for 
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238 responses (31 percent), which represents a visible orientation toward the 
professional domain of the sector. Fourth, tasks related to the end products of 
schooling (such as pupil achievement, school climate, special needs, and learning 
environment) are only modestly represented in the bulk of self- reported categories: 
49 out of 747 responses (6 percent). 
 
Taken together, the presented findings about task preferences and leadership 
dialogue with school principals show a gap between policymakers’ preferences and 
superintendents’ task preferences when it comes to managerial accountability (for 
example, inspection, quality assurance, and follow-up of student achievement data). 
As such, the findings illustrate multiple mediation categories: buffering, filtering, and 
translation. Further, current school reform implementation, which in policy 
documents is infused with managerial rhetoric, has been typically translated into a 
traditional school development language in the daily leadership discourse.  
 
Discussion 
A tangled web of couplings between actors 
Karl E. Weick (2001) argued that loose coupling is evident in a multi-level 
organizational system “when the components of a system affect each others: first, 
suddenly rather than continuously; second, occasionally rather than constantly; third, 
negligibly rather than significantly; fourth, indirectly rather than directly and fifth, 
eventually rather than immediately” (Weick, 2001, p. 383). Weick’s crucial point is 
that some lack of correspondence can be expected between the formal organizational 
system architecture, in terms of the plans, goals, strategies, and routines developed 
by state agencies, on one hand, and the negotiations, decisions, power distribution 
and operational activities carried out by superintendents, school boards, and school 
principals on the other. Further, Weick (1982) and Rowan (1990) observed a clear 
tendency of external control strategies in operation to presume that educational 
systems work as more tightly coupled systems, and that they can be managed like 
businesses in the corporate world. As Weick (1982) puts it, “they do what most 
managers do: namely, try to monitor performance closely, correct deviation from 
standards, specify job descriptions, design routines to deal with problems, give 
orders” (Weick, 1982, p. 673).  
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The findings reviewed for the present paper underscore that the Norwegian school 
governing system entails a “fuzzy” blend of tight and loose couplings, as is clearly 
visible in the Norwegian quality assurance system. The coupling between the state 
level and the county level (the educational governor) is quite tight, whereas the 
couplings to the next layer (the municipalities) are loosened. In the state supervision 
system, the municipalities targeted for supervision enjoy a degree of freedom to 
select schools that will be subjected to inspection, and to influence the targets for 
monitoring. Municipalities also have some influence in terms of conducting the 
yearly quality report. Taken together, despite the “messages” from the national 
school legislation, the quality assurance systems and the municipalities’ official 
strategies about monitoring, auditing, and inspecting student learning and test data, it 
is not clear that these demands are imposed on schooling in practical life, simply 
because superintendents are uniquely positioned to mediate these demands in their 
roles as gatekeepers.  
 
Turning to the political side in municipal school governing, school boards are tightly 
coupled to the superintendent and the school administration, yet partly decoupled 
from the practical life of schooling undertaken by principals and teachers (Paulsen & 
Strand, 2014). On the other hand, school board members are tightly coupled, not 
least through double membership in the municipal council, to the political power-
center of the municipality. They are uniquely positioned to influence on strategic 
decision making in school matters, yet decoupled from the implementation process 
(Paulsen et al., 2015). Despite the pattern of disconnection from local politicians, 
school principals seem to be tightly coupled to their superintendents through a web 
of social ties, formal affiliations, and membership in school leader groups. In a 
similar vein, superintendents seem to be the most important actors in terms of filling 
the gaps in the partly broken chain of school governing with strong ties to both 
principals and local politicians. Moreover, superintendents are linked to the top apex 
of the municipality organization through strong and dense ties. However, while these 
connections bring superintendents into the power-play of strategic decision making, 
they are perceived as not very useful in educational matters (Paulsen et al., 2015). 
Taken together, a well-diversified blend of tight and loose couplings, and strong and 
weak network ties, are visible in the municipalities’ governing line. 
Control and trust in concert in Norwegian school governing 
20 
 
 
 
The empirical research underpinning this review shows that the school governing 
system in Norway employs elements of both external control and professional trust. 
Seen from the bottom of the governing line, school principals express a high level of 
vertical trust towards their superintendent. Moreover, Norwegian superintendents are 
educators in the sense of being educated in teacher subjects and having worked most 
of their careers within the educational sector(Paulsen, 2014a). Therefore, it is fair to 
assume that superintendents and principals share a common ground of professional 
knowledge and dominant norms within the school institution. The strong indication 
of vertical trust is further supported by similar strong frequencies of a trusting 
climate in the school leader groups within the municipality organizations, which 
again strengthens the network embracing superintendents and school leaders. Finally, 
analysis of the superintendent data shows that Norwegian superintendents are active 
mediators of change initiatives through selection, translation, and buffering practices. 
Taken together, these elements bring evidence of trust and commitment components 
in practical school governing. 
 
On the other hand, there are also massive elements of external control in the 
Norwegian school governing system. Specifically, the Norwegian Directorate of 
Education and Training, paired with the establishment of the NSQA, are in charge of 
a large number of instruments that have the purpose of curriculum alignment and 
behavioral control of school leaders and teachers. Whereas curriculum alignment 
instruments, such as national testing, monitoring and ranking of schools, receive 
frequent media exposure, this is not the case when it comes to the many behavioral 
control instruments employed by the National Directorate of Education and Training. 
In particular, the strength of normative steering through streamlining of teacher 
workshops and national standardized curricula for school principal training and 
programs for other school leaders, - should be subjected to more investigation. This 
use of behavioral control is evidently a case for strong normative steering of the 
school institution in Norway. In aggregate, the empirical evidence reviewed indicates 
that a delicate blend of control and trust strategies is operative in practical school 
governing in Norway.   
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